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The minimalist perceptual crossing paradigm has emphasized the essential role of
interpersonal dynamics on social understanding. Within the particular case of minimalist
interaction, it has been argued that interpersonal processes can constitute social
cognition, at least partially, which calls for a paradigm shift in social cognition
studies. In this paper, we review several perceptual crossing experiments and their
theoretical implications, and propose an original experiment to go beyond strictly
dyadic interactions. Whereas past experiments have used objects as distracters of
dyadic interaction, our experiment aims at integrating objects themselves as the goal
of interpersonal coordination. We asked 24 subjects to participate in a minimalist
perceptual crossing experiment where they had to decide, based on their on-line
interaction in a one-dimensional digital space, which of the objects they perceived was
also perceptible by their partner. The main results suggest that the mutual awareness of
a shared object (SO) arises from the quality of sensorimotor coordination between the
partners. Indeed, the presence of a SO acts as a simultaneous affordance that attracts
and structures individual perceptive activities, giving both partners the opportunity to
co-construct a shared world where their respective actions make sense. We discuss
our results by way of an enactive account of social cognition, taking the joint perception
of a SO as a first step to account for joint attention.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional attempts to explain social cognition have been based on a set of individual internal
representations to explain the understanding of the other (e.g., Frith, 2008). In this case, an outside
observer usually interprets the observed phenomena, to recognize them as social and to define
the intention of the subjects who are interacting (e.g., Gallotti and Frith, 2013). Some alternative
approaches, describing an “interactive turn” in the study of social cognition (De Jaegher and Di
Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher et al., 2010), try on the contrary to understand these phenomena right from
the dynamics of perceptual interactions (e.g., Auvray et al., 2009). It is, however, very difficult to
propose explanatory schemes and an experimental situation that produce arguments for a specific
discussion between these perspectives.
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The minimalist perceptual crossing paradigm that we put
into place at the UTC aims to meet this requirement. This
experimental setup proposed “the simplest on-line paradigm”
(Auvray and Rohde, 2012), which allowed us to closely monitor
the co-construction of the interaction process in minimalist social
tasks. By oversimplifying the available set of actions and sensory
feedback, this paradigm provided the opportunity to precisely
analyze the spatiotemporal unfolding of individual activities and
collective dynamics (Lenay and Stewart, 2012).
The results of the pioneering study (Lenay et al., 2006; Auvray
et al., 2009) and its variants (Lenay and Stewart, 2012; Froese
et al., 2014a,b), as we will show, provided an experimental
demonstration of the entanglement of individual and collective
dimensions in social cognition (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2016). Nevertheless, it seemed
imperative to us to complete this demonstration, by proposing
an experiment that surpasses the frame of dyadic interactions
in order to fully illustrate social cognition. We thus will present
an original extension of the minimalist perceptual crossing
paradigm within the context of triadic/deictic situations (mutual
perception of an object, designation, joint attention).
THE PERCEPTUAL CROSSING
PARADIGM
The pioneering study of minimalist perceptual crossing was
proposed during the last decade (Lenay et al., 2006; Auvray
et al., 2009). Two participants were using a technical device
in order to interact in a virtual environment. By means of
a computer mouse, each participant moves a receptor field
laterally in a one-dimensional digital space, and the meeting
of this field with any “object” in the environment activates an
all-or-none tactile stimulation. Each participant can encounter
three kinds of objects, each of which delivers strictly the same
stimulation: the body-object moved by the other participant
(which is superimposed on her receptor field), a fixed object and a
mobile object. It is crucial to note that the mobile object is actually
a lure attached to the receptor field of each participant by a rigid
virtual link (see Figure 1).
Consequently, the mobile object moves exactly like the
receptor field to which it is attached, copying all the movements
of the latter at a fixed distance. Participants were invited to
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the one-dimensional digital space
explored by the participants. Participant P1 receives a tactile stimulation
whenever she encounters either her fixed object, or the receptor field of
participant P2, or the mobile object attached to the receptor field of P2 (from
Lenay and Stewart, 2012).
interact for three 5-min sessions, and they had to click with
their mouse whenever they thought the stimulations they were
receiving were due to encounters with their partner.
It turns out that participants succeeded in finding each
other, and mostly clicked when they actually met. However, a
precise analysis revealed that they were unable to differentiate
the other participant from the mobile object. Indeed, the
ratios between clicks and stimulations showed that participants
were as likely to click when the stimulations they received
resulted from the encounter with their partner as when
they resulted from the encounter with the mobile object.
From there, the results can be interpreted in two opposite
ways, depending on whether the emphasis in explaining how
the task is resolved is put on the interaction process as
such (interactionist account) or on the individual processes
(individualist account).
The interactionist account focuses on the interaction process
to explain the performance (Auvray et al., 2009). As the
participants do not actually discriminate their partner from the
mobile object, the resolution of the task cannot be attributed to
the individual recognition of the other’s intentionality. Instead,
while each participant actively searches to interact with each
other, the meeting of their perceptual activities gives rise to a
kind of “attractor” of the collective dynamics: both participants
tend to oscillate one around the other in a more or less
coordinated fashion, each perceptual activity being organized
by the perceptual activity of the other. By contrast, since the
movement of the mobile object is not directed toward the other
participant, it can only generate a one-sided coordination that
cannot maintain the interaction, as does the perceptual crossing.
As a result, the resolution of the task seems to rely on the
emergent dynamic property of the interaction process, before
any conscious mechanism, simply because it ensures that the
participants meet each other more frequently than other sources
of stimulations (ibid.). While the collective dynamics is here
considered a fully fledged feature in the resolution of the social
task, this experiment has led to the controversial idea that
interaction can be constitutive of social cognition (De Jaegher
et al., 2010).
By contrast, the individualist account, which fits with the
classical approach to social cognition (e.g., Frith, 2008), considers
that the crucial point of the task remains the individual formation
of social judgments. Each individual has merely to detect that
the other is moving, and makes their judgment accordingly
(Michael and Overgaard, 2012; Overgaard and Michael, 2013).
But in order to avoid the mobile object, one should be able to
detect that these movements are contingent with one’s own. This
was not the case, as the participants did not discriminate the
contingent movements of the body-object of the partner from
the non-contingent movements of the mobile object. Crucially,
as the participants also click when there is no actual interaction
(when they meet the mobile object), the interaction process is
not involved in (and hence, cannot constitute) social cognition, at
least at the level of individual judgment. Therefore, the interactive
context is no more than scaffolding for social cognition, by
facilitating (in some cases) the individual processes that lead
to the decision to click. In a way, social interaction is nothing
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but informational input among other inputs. In a nutshell, the
collective dynamics has no influence as such in the formation of
social judgment: social cognition thus remains relegated to a set
of individual mechanisms.
TOWARD AN ENTANGLEMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
DIMENSIONS
The discussion around these two perspectives has given rise to
a set of complementary experiments (for a review, see Auvray
and Rohde, 2012). Some original extensions were proposed, for
instance where there were no objects, so as to focus on the strictly
dyadic interaction alone (e.g., Iizuka et al., 2009; Deschamps et al.,
2012). The initial experiment has also been replicated, with the
introduction of some crucial variants, such as the multimodal
enrichment of the sensory inputs delivered to the participants
(Lenay and Stewart, 2012), or as the one-single-click procedure
imposed to the participants in a more collaborative version of the
initial protocol (Froese et al., 2014a,b). Let’s have a more precise
look at these variants.
In the first, a sound was randomly attributed to each of
the three objects (Lenay and Stewart, 2012). After each 2-min
trial, participants were asked to associate each sound with the
corresponding objects. The results show high correct categorizing
scores for the three objects (ibid.). Here, the participants’
capacity to distinguish the perceptual crossing dynamics from the
encounter with the other objects, in particular with the mobile
lures, explained their individual success. The participants could
then grasp the interpersonal dynamics with the help provided by
the intrinsic sound properties of the objects. If the authors argue
in favor of an interactionist approach of social cognition, they also
point to the necessary role of the individual, brought to grasp the
collective dynamics that she helped to bring out (ibid.). However,
a methodological flaw prevents a possible constitutive relation
between interaction and social cognition from being determined.
In fact, the auto-organization of the perceptual crossing dynamics
was determined by a perceptual quality defined a priori and
above all, outside the interaction itself. In other words, the
categorization of the objects was quite explicit on an individual
level, but it was not truly constituted collectively (Overgaard and
Michael, 2013).
In another variant of the pioneering study, Froese et al.
(2014a,b) made the task explicitly collaborative, so that the
participants solved the task by an active co-regulation of their
perceptual activities. In addition, the participants could only
provide one response per trial, and were asked to fill out
subjective questionnaires (Perceptual Awareness Scale and Trust
Scale) aiming to characterize their experience of the presence of
the other participant for each trial (ibid.). In these conditions, the
results highlight a very strong propensity for the participants to
click on the body-object of their partner, as well as an effective
discrimination between this body-object and its attached lure.
Interestingly, these clicks were most often carried out together
(as opposed to the cases where only one of the two participants in
a pair clicked on the other), and in a more or less synchronous
manner (even though the participants were not aware of their
partner’s click, they both correctly clicked in a very short interval).
Furthermore, the clicks performed in these “Joint Success Trials”
were correlated with a high degree of turn-taking, as a reflection
of an active co-organization of the interaction process.
Under these empirical evidences, the authors claim that
the “(. . .) social judgments were not so much based on an
individual recognition of the other but rather on a mutually
shared recognition of each other, i.e., on an interactively shared
cognitive process” (Froese et al., 2014a, p. 4, emphasis in original).
Of course, one might claim that these results do not really
disentangle the possibility of an individualist interpretation.
In fact, both participants may have simultaneously recognized
the other based on their own judgments (e.g., Michael and
Overgaard, 2012). But without any reference to the interaction
process as an active part of the performance, a strict individualist
interpretation of the clicks may consider their proximity as
coincidental and hence, this solution looks hardly convincing.
In line with the interpretation of Lenay and Stewart (2012), it
seems then imperative to consider together the individual and
the collective dimensions in perceptual crossing experiments. For
instance, the collective performance observed in the experiment
of Froese et al. (2014a,b) was accompanied by a clear experience
of the other, on an individual level, as reported in the
questionnaires. To sum up, this variation has the merit of
demonstrating in a very clear way that the participants’ active
co-regulation made possible not only a shared process of mutual
recognition, but also a subjective individual experience of the
other (ibid.).
To reconcile the individualist and interactionist explanations,
hybrid proposals may appear as a good solution. For instance,
integrative approaches propose to hold together the processes
that stem directly from the dynamics of social interactions
(processes that are fast, efficient, stimulus-driven, and relatively
inflexible), with the traditional processes of social cognition
(processes that are relatively slow, cognitively laborious, and
flexible), such as the individual capacity of mindreading (Bohl
and van den Bos, 2012). These two types of processes are
meant to capture different aspects of social cognition, and are
supposed to be simultaneously involved in everyday situations.
However, if this integrative approach opens the way for a suitable
consideration of the influence of the interaction as such on social
cognition, it does not totally solve the problem by creating a
dichotomy between two sets of relatively independent processes
(for a discussion, see De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2013; Di Paolo and
De Jaegher, 2016). One possible way to account for a functional
relationship between the two types of processes may rely on
a developmental trajectory between them, through a pluralist
approach (Fiebich and Coltheart, 2015). It is here argued that
early embodied practices (expressed for instance through bodily
coordination) are at the origin of social understanding. If these
embodied practices can lead to subsequent “high-level” skills (like
mindreading or narrative practices), the point is that they still
remain relevant throughout life (e.g., Gallagher and Hutto, 2008;
de Bruin and de Haan, 2012). However, the question of how
the two types of processes coexist, when they are concurrently
available, remains insufficiently addressed so far.
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In our view, the true consideration of the individual and
collective dimensions in social cognition needs a more genuine
paradigm shift. For instance, a non-reductionist and naturalist
approach of cognition, as proposed by enaction (Varela et al.,
1991; Stewart et al., 2010), leads in fact to consider the “deep
entanglement” between interpersonal dynamics and individual
capacities for social understanding (Di Paolo and De Jaegher,
2016). This entanglement is fully captured by the concept of
Participatory Sense-Making (PSM; De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007).
To explain PSM, we must start from the definition of two
enactive concepts, namely those of autonomy and sense-making,
which are fundamentally intertwined in living organisms (for a
full picture of the enactive concepts, see Di Paolo et al., 2010).
A network of processes is autonomous if these processes actively
participate in the generation and the sustaining of the network
that produce them. By this activity, the network generates its
own identity and distinguishes itself from its environment, which
does not mean that this network does not continually exchange
matter and energy with that environment. Crucially, for the
self-sustaining of the network, it has to be adaptive, i.e., it
must actively regulate its coupling with the environment, and
constitute its own values. Sense-making is the ongoing process
by which the autonomous systems “cast a web of significance
on their world” (ibid., p.4), by continuously generating the
meaning of the environment through their own coupling with it.
The world is not pre-given but enacted through the activity of
organisms.
From there, an enactive definition of social interaction is made
possible. Social interaction is “a co-regulated coupling between at
least two autonomous agents, where (i) the co-regulation and the
coupling mutually affect each other, constituting a self-sustaining
organization in the domain of relational dynamics, and (ii) the
autonomy of the agents involved is not destroyed (although its
scope can be augmented or reduced)” (De Jaegher et al., 2010,
pp. 442–443). Given this definition, PSM is the interactive facet
of sense-making: it designates the process by which individual
activities of sense-making come together and merges, bringing
out a specific autonomous dynamics, enabling the participants to
make sense of andwith the other (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).
In sum, PSM is defined as “the coordination of intentional activity
in interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are
affected and new domains of social sense-making can be
generated that were not available to each individual on her own”
(ibid., p. 497). The unit of analysis of social cognition is thus
no longer reduced to the individual, but makes reference to a
system as a (self-)organized whole, including the agents involved
in the interaction, the process of interaction itself, as well as
the context in which these interactions take place. PSM thus
proposes a pertinent middle path between a strictly individual
(social cognition refers necessarily to individual mechanisms,
e.g., Overgaard and Michael, 2013) and a radically interactionist
approach (interactive factors are sufficient to account for social
cognition, e.g., Auvray et al., 2009). In short, PSM is a suitable
framework that focuses on the dynamical relations between the
individual and collective dimensions in social understanding (Di
Paolo and De Jaegher, 2016).
TOWARD TRIADIC INTERACTIONS
Today, in spite of the pertinence of the minimalist perceptual
crossing paradigm to illustrate the concept of PSM, an additional
step remains to be taken in order to fully account for an enactive
approach to social cognition. In fact, social cognition cannot be
reduced to dyadic situations, but equally concerns triadic/deictic
situations (mutual perception of an object, designation, joint
attention). If the concept of PSM theoretically summarizes these
specific situations by offering a suitable frame for analyzing
the functional links that the individual mechanisms and the
collective dynamics maintain as part of the sharing of objects, an
experimental support is yet to be provided.
The joint attention phenomenon is paradigmatic for relatively
complex triadic situations. It designates the situation where
(at least) two participants coordinate their attention so as to
share a reference point, whether it is an object, an event
or a third person (e.g., Mundy and Newell, 2007). This key
skill of social development first requires the awareness that
the participants direct an attentional focus on the world,
and most importantly, that this focus can be shared. The
question of what is exactly shared here, and how this sharing
is realized is the main point of numerous contributions in the
joint attention literature (for contrastive accounts about joint
attention, see the full issue of Seemann, 2012a). In short, we
can sketch two main postures: the “jointness” or the “sharing”
in joint attention can be considered as an information that has
to be processed individually through some internal cognitive
operations or as a phenomenon interactively constituted in
the ongoing interpersonal coordination (for a discussion, see
Seemann, 2012b).
For instance, from an individualist perspective, joint attention
would be the result of a reflexive capacity of the individuals
involved in the interaction, which makes possible their
understanding of the fact that another person has an attentional
focus on the same object (Tomasello, 1995). Thus, it is about
to associate an intentional attitude (e.g., Gergely and Csibra,
2003) with a capacity to ascribe this attitude to another person
(e.g., Tomasello, 1999). Yet this individualist conception leads
to minimizing the role of mutual engagement and active co-
regulation of behaviors in arriving at social understanding
(Gallagher, 2001; Reddy and Morris, 2004; De Jaegher and Di
Paolo, 2007). It reduces the phenomena of joint attention to
a succession of perceptual states, ignoring the dynamic process
by which interpersonal coordination takes form (Reddy, 2012).
In fact, joint attention designates above all a sensorimotor
coordination (Fiebich and Gallagher, 2012; Gallagher, 2012), in
other words, a specific sequence of coordinated activities which
most often take place in the more global framework of an
interactive context, from which it cannot be dissociated (Kidwell
and Zimmerman, 2007). It thus unfolds in a mutually available
space (Butterworth and Jarrett, 1991), where the very kinetics
of the attentional orientation movements are all perceptual cues
grasped by the social partners for serving the organization of their
own behavior (Moore et al., 1997).
Within this context, the coordination of the attentional focuses
can only make sense inside of a pragmatic context that offers,
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by intermediary of a shared object (SO), a structure to the
attentional orientation of the individual and that of her partner.
Individually, in fact, the object is an affordance that attracts
the attentional focus and organizes the action. In contrast with
a strict gibsonian definition of affordance (Gibson, 1979), we
define here affordances as local singularities that grasp one’s
perceptual activity and organize the subsequent actions as a result
of the successive sensory feedbacks. Crucially, the affordance is
not directly perceived through a single and isolated stimulation,
but is constituted as a function of the particular succession of
stimulations over the course of one’s exploratory gestures. As
already noted in a recent paper, the three sources of stimulations
in perceptual crossing experiments (the fixed object, the mobile
object, and the body-object moved by the other participant) can
be accounted for in terms of affordances (Froese et al., 2014a): the
fixed object provides an opportunity for a spatial determination
through a reversible exploratory gesture, while the mobile object
only enables the possibility of a dispersed, one-sided and hence,
overly unstable interaction. Because of its responsive nature,
the body-object moved by the partner affords a globally stable
interaction that makes possible an interpersonal coordination
(ibid.).
Within the case of triadic interaction, the object of shared
attention can be thought of as a kind of “simultaneous affordance”
(Marsh et al., 2006): it attracts the attentional focuses in a
reciprocal way, each of the participants being able to relocate
the SO by their own reversible actions. The combination of this
simultaneous affordance with the affordance for a globally stable
interaction, provided by the responsive presence of the other,
then sets the conditions for PSM (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007). The awareness or the knowledge of the fact that the object
of attention is shared is then co-constructed in the meeting of
individual activities through the emergence of an autonomous
relational dynamics (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007), which is,
in our view, an enactive account of joint attention.
As we have already emphasized, this enactive reading
of the joint attention phenomenon, which highlights the
interdependence of the individual and collective dimensions,
suffers from an absence of experimental demonstration. The
minimalist perceptual crossing paradigm then arises as the ideal
candidate to carry out this mission.
AN ORIGINAL PERCEPTUAL CROSSING
EXPERIMENT
We therefore propose an experiment that aims at studying
interpersonal engagement in a shared digital space, going
further than strictly dyadic interactions. Here the perceptual
crossing of two participants has the mutual perception of
an object as the explicit goal: the objects are thus not
used as distractors of interpersonal coordination, but are
integrated as a mutually intended goal through the process of
interaction.
The objective is thus to experimentally demonstrate that
interpersonal coordination of perceptual activities (directed
toward the other and toward the objects) is a necessary
and sufficient condition for joint attention. To force the
deployment of this coordination, we will start from a strict
minimalist framework, with sensory information reduced to
all-or-nothing stimulations (‘Mono’ condition). In addition, we
decided to create two other configurations (‘Differentiated’ and
‘Parallelism’ conditions, see below), because we thought that, in
the context of interpersonal coordination around SOs, minimal
undifferentiated stimulations would lead to major confusion.
Indeed, participants cannot perceive an object and the other
person at the same time, and cannot try to “point out” an object
to her partner without “hiding” it.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Population
Twenty-four adults, grouped in pairs, participated in this
experiment. They were 18- to 25-year-old students, recruited
through an ad system at the University of Technology of
Compiègne (France). They had no specific knowledge about the
device used or the theoretical issues of the experiment. The study
protocol followed the tenets of the Declaration of Helsinki of June
1964 (amended during the 64th General Assembly of the World
Medical Association in October 2013). All the participants have
granted their written informed consent.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Each participant sat in front of a laptop in one of two
quiet adjacent rooms. The laptops were equipped with an
optical mouse, a 16-pin tactile stimulator case (namely, two
piezoelectric Braille cells corresponding to four columns of
four pins) and headphones to receive instructions. Participants
were asked to use the mouse with their dominant hand
and place the index of their non-dominant hand upon
the stimulator case. They were not blindfolded during the
experiment, but no information could be seen on their
screens. In one of the rooms, a server was present to enable
the connection of the two laptops through a Local Area
Network.
With their mouse, participants can move a cursor laterally in a
one-dimensional digital space 400 pixels long. That space loops
on itself, which means that participants are not aware of any
boundaries. The cursor is actually a body-object 2-pixels long
situated in the middle of a receptor field, 16-pixels long. When
the cursor meets at least one colored pixel (from any object of
the shared space, including the body-object of the partner), the
tactile stimulator case activates in a way that is dependent on the
experimental conditions described below.
For each trial, three fixed 2-pixel objects are placed along the
one-dimensional space. One of these is jointly perceptible by both
participants whereas the two others are private, that is to say that
each is respectively perceptible by only one of the two participants
(see Figure 2). In other words, for a given participant, two objects
are perceptible for each trial: a shared one (SO, for Shared Object)
and a private one (OwnPO, for Own Private Object). The private
object of the partner is thus called OtherPO (for Other Private
Object). The position of these objects varies for each trial.
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of the one-dimensional digital space explored by the participants. Participant P1 receives a tactile stimulation whenever
she encounters either her Private Object, or the Shared Object (SO), or the body-object moved by P2. Note that as illustrated on the right of the figure, the receptor
field of P2 is oriented downward: this means that P2 can perceive only the objects (and the part of SO) located below the line, consequently being ignorant of the
Private Object of P1.
Design and Procedure
We confronted each pair of participants with the three
experimental conditions, always one after the other but in a
counterbalanced order for each pair. Each condition is defined as
a function of the type of stimulations delivered when the receptor
field of a participant meets the fixed objects or the body-object
moved by her partner.
In the ‘Mono’ condition, the receptor field is 16 pixels long.
When it meets any object of the environment, the 16 pins of
the tactile stimulator case are activated in an all-or-none fashion.
The stimulations resulting from the meeting of the fixed objects
or the body-object of the partner are thus undifferentiated. This
condition refers to the basic setup of the minimalist perceptual
crossing paradigm, as it was used in previous experiments.
In the ‘Differentiated’ condition, the receptor field is also
16 pixels long. However, this time, when it crosses the
body-object of the partner or a fixed object, it activates
differentiated stimulations. The meeting of the partner results
in the simultaneous activation of the four upper pins, whereas
the meeting of any fixed object (whether shared or private) leads
to the simultaneous activation of the four lower pins of the
stimulator case. With this configuration, participants are able
to perceive a fixed object and the partner at the same time:
thus, the four upper and the four lower pins are simultaneously
activated.
Finally, in the ‘Parallelism’ condition, the receptor field is
divided into 4 four adjacent parts of 4 pixels each. Each
of these parts refers topologically (or “in parallel”) to each
column of pins on the stimulator case. Therefore, when the
leftmost part of the receptor field crosses any object of the
environment, the four leftmost pins of the stimulator case (the
first column) are activated simultaneously. When the second part
from the left crosses any object, the second column of pins is
activated simultaneously, and so on. As in the ‘Mono’ condition,
stimulations are undifferentiated, but here participants are able
to perceive a fixed object and their partner at the same time,
provided that the distance between the two sources of stimulation
lies between 2 and 16 pixels (respectively the length of the objects
and that of the receptor field).
Each of these conditions consists in 13 trials: five
familiarization trials and eight experimental trials.
Familiarization trials are designed so that each participant
can acquire a minimal experience of the device before each
experimental phase, including the knowledge of the type of
stimuli that the objects and the partner may cause, depending
on the experimental condition in which they are. In the first
familiarization trial, participants are informed that by moving
their mouse laterally, they can encounter a single fixed object.
No other source of stimulations can be encountered. Participants
are asked to explore their environment, to find the object, and
crucially, to be attentive to the particular way the stimulator
case activates when they find it, because their activation will
be different across each condition. In the first condition the
participants perform, they are also asked to move in the direction
of their choice until they get two successive stimulations. This
step consists in indicating to the participants that the two
stimulations are not due to the presence of two distinct objects,
but that a single object has been encountered twice. Then, the
distance between the two stimulations is the total length of the
space, which will be identical across the whole experiment. This
first trial is not timed, and lasts as long as the experimenter thinks
it is necessary.
In the following familiarization trials, participants have the
opportunity to interact with their partner during a collaborative
four-round mini-game. In these trials, no object is present: the
only source of tactile stimulation is then the body-object moved
by the partner. As in the first familiarization trial, participants
are asked to be attentive to the way the stimulator case activates
when they cross the other, as these stimulations can be different
from those received when they encountered an object before.
Before the mini-game starts, the participants are told that two
roles will be alternatively assigned to each of them by way of the
headphones. If the participant A is “Guider,” the participant B is
“Follower” and vice versa. Guider is informed that he can find
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a sound at a precise location of the space, but that the Follower
cannot hear it. Her objective is to locate this sound, and try to
guide her partner there. Follower is informed that the Guider will
try to bring him in a particular location of the space. Again, each
round is not timed, and stops when the experimenter finds that
both participants stop on or oscillate around the sound location.
When this is the case, the experimenter starts the next trial, which
is identical except that the sound event is moved and that the roles
are reversed: the Guider becomes the Follower and vice versa.
Before experimental trials start, we remind the participants
that the stimulations they experienced in the familiarization trials
when they crossed an object or the body-object of their partner
will be identical in the following experimental trials. Participants
are asked to collaborate with their partner, interacting tactilely
with her, in order to find the SO among their two perceptible
objects (SO and OwnPO). Each of these trials lasted 75 s.
Individual instructions, given through headphones, indicated the
beginning and the end of the trial. Sixty seconds after the trial
started, participants were invited to click with their mouse on
the SO. The clicks eventually performed before this 15-s time
window were not taken into account. After each condition, a
2-min break is proposed, during which the participants cannot
interact.
The perceptual trajectories of both participants, including
their position in space over time, as well as the exact position
of their clicks, were recorded for each trial. When the three
experimental conditions were performed, we proceeded to a
debriefing where participants could express the difficulties they
had and the strategies they used in order to solve the task.
Whatever the experimental condition, we expected the
participants to click more often on the SO than on the private
ones. Our assumption was that their success would be enabled
through the emergence and the stabilization of an interpersonal
dynamics around the SO. However, we also expected the
experimental conditions to have an impact on this success,
notably by modulating the very nature of individual engagement
in the environment. Be that as it may, these minimalist conditions
would force the spatiotemporal unfolding of perceptual activities
and collective dynamics, as it was assumed in previous perceptual
crossing experiments. These could be insightful in precisely
investigating the nature of interpersonal coordination within the
context of triadic interactions.
RESULTS
Categories of Clicks
First, we investigated the clicks performed by the participants. We
considered four categories of clicks, as a function of the distance
between the objects and the receptor field at the time of each click.
We assumed a tolerance margin of 32 pixels around each object
(corresponding to the length of the receptor field from either side
of the objects with at least one pixel in common) to categorize
the clicks performed: (i) around the Shared Object (SO clicks);
(ii) around the Private Object of the participant (OwnPO clicks);
(iii) around the Private Object of the partner (OtherPO clicks);
and (iv) at any other location (Empty clicks). Note here that we
excluded from the analysis the trials where participants did not
click (averaging 3.4% of the trials).
We analyzed the average number of clicks assigned to each
category for each participant and for each experimental condition
(Figure 3). As the distribution of this data fitted with a normal
curve, we used parametric statistical procedures.
Across all conditions, we observed a mean percentage of SO
clicks above the mean percentages of clicks assigned to other
categories (Figure 3).
A one-way ANOVA showed a significant difference across
the categories of clicks for the ‘Mono’ condition [F(3.92) = 27.11;
p< 0.01], for the ‘Differentiated’ condition [F(3.92) = 452.38; p<
0.01], and for the ‘Parallelism’ condition [F(3.92) = 67.91;
p < 0.01]. Post hoc Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that the mean
percentage of SO clicks is greater than the mean percentage of
OwnPO clicks (p < 0.01), OtherPO clicks (p < 0.01) and Empty
clicks (p< 0.01) for each condition.
Analysis of Perceptual Trajectories
In order to explain these results, we investigated the perceptual
trajectories of the participants in each trial (see Figure 4).
This analysis sought to explain the clicks performed as a
function of what actually happened in each trial. We first carried
out a qualitative analysis of these trajectories that we linked to the
statements of the participants during the debriefing period of the
experiment. We thus identified a set of indicators to characterize
the nature and the quality of interpersonal coordination for each
category of clicks and for each experimental condition imposed.
Four indicators emerged: (1) the total duration spent by the
participants around each object (SO, OwnPO, and OtherPO);
(2) the total number of interpersonal stimulations around each
object (SO, OwnPO, and OtherPO); (3) the duration of mutual
stops around each object (SO, OwnPO, and OtherPO); (4)
the total duration of interactive sequences around each object
(SO, OwnPO, and OtherPO). For each of these indicators, we
aggregated the data of each participant (e.g., by adding the time
spent by a given participant around SO and so on) for each trial
of the three conditions.
In addition, we split the space into three distinct ranges to
investigate the link between this data and the position of the
clicks: (i) the “Click Area” extends to a range of 40 pixels around
the click position (10% of space length); ii) the “Near area”
extends to a range of 60 pixels from either side of the “Click area”
(30% of space length), and (iii) the “Away area” extends to a range
of 120 pixels from either side of the “Near area” (60% of space
length) (Figure 5).
As the distribution of this data did not fit with a normal curve,
we used non-parametric statistical procedures.
Total Duration Spent by the Participants around the
Objects
We investigated the total duration spent by the participants in a
40-pixel range around SO, OwnPO, and OtherPO (Figure 6).
A Friedman ANOVA for dependent samples showed a
significant difference in the time spent around the objects
across the ‘Mono’ condition (χ2 = 142.13; p < 0.01), across the
‘Differentiated’ condition (χ2 = 204.29; p < 0.01) and across
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FIGURE 3 | Mean percentages of clicks assigned to each category as a function of experimental conditions.
the ‘Parallelism’ condition (χ2 = 106.55; p < 0.01). Wilcoxon
matched pairs tests revealed a significantly higher duration spent
by the participants around SO than around OwnPO (‘Mono’
condition:Z= 2.88; p< 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition:Z= 9.65;
p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 4.07; p < 0.01), or around
OtherPO (‘Mono’ condition: Z = 9.64; p < 0.01; ‘Differentiated’
condition: Z = 11.56; p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 8.89;
p < 0.01). Duration spent around OwnPO was always longer
than the duration spent around OtherPO (‘Mono’ condition:
Z = 8.80, p< 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 7.64, p< 0.01;
‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 7.34, p < 0.01). In addition, we
observed that the participants spent more time in the Click area
than in the Near and Away areas across each condition (Figure 7).
A Friedman ANOVA for dependent samples
revealed a significant difference in the duration spent
in each interval around the click position across the
FIGURE 4 | Time series of an illustrative trial. The perceptual trajectories
of a pair of participants can be spotted across the one-dimensional space
(y-axis) over the 75 s (x-axis) of a given trial (i.e., the second trial of the ‘Mono’
condition). Solid light blue and light red lines plot the position of the two
participants (P1 and P2), while the dotted blue and red lines represent the
position of their respective private object (P1-OwnPO and P2-OwnPO). The
dotted black line plots the position of the Shared Object. In this trial, both
participants clicked on the Shared Object (blue and red crosses).
‘Mono’ condition (χ2 = 67.61; p < 0.01), across the
‘Differentiated’ condition (χ2 = 196.88; p < 0.01), and across
the ‘Parallelism’ condition (χ2 = 160.54; p < 0.01). Wilcoxon
matched pairs tests indicated that the duration spent by the
participants inside the Click area (10% of space length) was
significantly longer than the duration spent inside the Near area
(‘Mono’ condition: Z = 8.84; p< 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition:
Z = 10.85; p< 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 10.04; p< 0.01)
or inside the Away area (‘Mono’ condition: Z = 4.80; p < 0.01;
‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 9.55; p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’
condition: Z = 6.29; p < 0.01), although these two areas are
respectively 30 and 60% of the space length.
Number of Interpersonal Stimulations around the
Objects
A second indicator dealt with the number of interpersonal
stimulations that occurred, regardless of their duration, in a
40-pixel range around SO, OwnPO, and OtherPO (Figure 8).
A Friedman ANOVA for dependent samples showed a
significant difference in the number of interpersonal stimul-
ations around the objects across the ‘Mono’
condition (χ2 = 59.67; p < 0.01), across the ‘Differen-
tiated’ condition (χ2 = 145.05; p < 0.01), and across the
‘Parallelism’ condition (χ2 = 48.50; p < 0.01). Wilcoxon
matched pairs tests revealed that the number of interpersonal
stimulations was significantly larger around SO than around
OwnPO (‘Mono’ condition: Z = 6.07; p < 0.01; ‘Differentiated’
FIGURE 5 | Schematic illustration of the “Click area,” the “Near Area”
and the “Away area,” defined a posteriori as a function of the click
position of a participant in a given trial.
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FIGURE 6 | Box plots of the total duration (in ms) spent by the
participants around each object (SO, OwnPO, and OtherPO) over the
conditions (Plot: Median, Box: 25–75%, Whisker: Non-Outlier Range).
FIGURE 7 | Box plots of the total duration (in ms) spent by the
participants across each condition (‘Mono,’ ‘Differentiated’ and
‘Parallelism’ conditions) over the Click area, the Near area and the
Away area (Plot: Median, Box:25–75%, Whisker: Non-Outlier Range).
condition: Z = 9.51; p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 5.83;
p < 0.01), and around OtherPO (‘Mono’ condition: Z = 6.23;
p < 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 9.57; p < 0.01;
‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 5.91; p < 0.01). The difference
between OwnPO and OtherPO was not significant for any of the
experimental conditions (p> 0.05).
In addition, we observed a greater number of interpersonal
stimulations in the Click area than in the Near and Away areas
across each experimental condition (Figure 9).
A Friedman ANOVA for dependent samples indicated a
significant difference in the number of interpersonal stimulations
occurring in each interval around the click position across
the ‘Mono’ condition (χ2 = 28.62; p < 0.01), across the
‘Differentiated’ condition (χ2 = 139.93; p < 0.01), and across
FIGURE 8 | Box plots of the number of interpersonal stimulations
around each object (SO, OwnPO and OtherPO) over the conditions
(Plot: Median, Box:25–75%, Whisker: Non-Outlier Range).
FIGURE 9 | Box plots of the number of interpersonal stimulations in
each condition (‘Mono’, ‘Differentiated’ and ‘Parallelism’ conditions)
over the Click area, the Near area and the Away area (Plot: Median,
Box:25–75%, Whisker: Non-Outlier Range).
the ‘Parallelism’ condition (χ2 = 69.91; p < 0.01). Once
again, Wilcoxon matched pairs tests showed a number
of interpersonal stimulations significantly larger in the
Click area (10% of space length) than in the Near area
(‘Mono’ condition: Z = 5.28; p < 0.01; ‘Differentiated’
condition: Z = 10.31; p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition:
Z = 8.77; p < 0.01), and the Away area (‘Mono’ condition:
Z = 4.19; p < 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 7.50;
p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 5.55; p < 0.01),
although these two areas are respectively 30 and 60% of
space length.
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Duration of Mutual Stops around the Objects
We considered a third indicator: the duration of mutual stops,
defined as the total duration where both participants stopped one
on the other and maintained a perceptual crossing for at least 2 s
(Figure 10).
A Friedman ANOVA for dependent samples showed
a significant difference in the duration of these
mutual stops around the objects across the ‘Mono’ condi-
tion (χ2 = 56.83; p < 0.01), across the ‘Differentiated’ condition
(χ2 = 178.54; p < 0.01), and across the ‘Parallelism’ condition
(χ2 = 43.81; p < 0.01). Wilcoxon matched pairs tests revealed
that the mutual stops lasted longer if they occurred around SO
than around OwnPO (‘Mono’ condition: Z = 5.73; p < 0.01;
‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 11.09; p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’
condition: Z = 6.31; p < 0.01), or around OtherPO (‘Mono’
condition: Z = 5.70; p < 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition:
Z = 11.11; p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 6.35; p < 0.01).
However, no difference was found between OwnPO and
OtherPO for any of the experimental conditions (p> 0.05).
We brought to light that the participants stopped on
each other more frequently in the Click area than in the
Near and Away areas across each experimental condition
(Figure 11).
A Friedman ANOVA for dependent samples showed a
significant difference in the duration of mutual stops between
the intervals around click position across the ‘Mono’ condi-
tion (χ2 = 75.90; p < 0.01), across the ‘Differentiated’ condition
(χ2 = 234.83; p < 0.01), and across the ‘Parallelism’ condition
(χ2 = 146.49; p < 0.01). Wilcoxon matched pairs tests indicated
that the duration of mutual stops inside the Click area (10% of
the space length) was always longer than those that took place
inside the Near area (30% of the space length; ‘Mono’ condition:
Z = 8.51; p < 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 10.90;
p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 9.91; p < 0.01) and
inside the Away area (60% of the space length; ‘Mono’ condition:
Z= 6.99; p< 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition: Z= 10.63; p< 0.01;
‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 9.29; p< 0.01).
Duration of Interactive Sequences around the Objects
A final analysis aimed at characterizing the quality of
interpersonal coordination between both participants by
looking at the duration of the interactive sequences in which
they were involved for each trial. We considered a sequence
as interactive when it contained at least two interpersonal
stimulations and when the gaps between those stimulations did
not exceed 2 s. We aggregated the duration of these sequences
for each pair of participants in each trial. Note that this indicator
did not take into account the duration of the mutual stops when
they lasted for more than 2 s.
First of all, it is important to note that the median of the
durations of interactive sequences per trial was relatively high
in the ‘Mono’ condition (Q1 = 24.22%; Median = 37.62%;
Q3 = 44.59%), and in the ‘Parallelism’ condition (Q1 = 25.05%;
Median = 34.95%; Q3 = 49.04%). However, the duration of
these sequences was lower in the ‘Differentiated’ condition, with
a larger interquartile range (Q1 = 12.72%; Median = 24.67%;
Q3= 43.60%).
A Friedman ANOVA for dependent samples concerning the
duration of interactive sequences around the objects revealed a
significant difference across the ‘Mono’ condition (χ2 = 45.43;
p< 0.01), across the ‘Differentiated’ condition (χ2 = 115.84; p<
0.01) and across the ‘Parallelism’ condition (χ2 = 41.29; p< 0.01)
(Figure 12).
Wilcoxon matched pairs tests showed that the duration of
interactive sequences was longer around SO than around OwnPO
(‘Mono’ condition: Z = 5.53; p< 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition:
Z = 8.32; p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 4.93; p < 0.01),
and around OtherPO (‘Mono’ condition: Z = 5.99; p < 0.01;
‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 9.01; p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’
condition: Z = 5.82; p < 0.01). However, even if we could not
conclude there was a difference between OwnPO and OtherPO
FIGURE 10 | Box plots of the duration (in ms) of mutual stops around
each object (SO, OwnPO and OtherPO) over the conditions (Plot:
Median, Box:25–75%, Whisker: Non-Outlier Range).
FIGURE 11 | Box plots of the duration (in ms) of mutual stops across
each condition (‘Mono’, ‘Differentiated’ and ‘Parallelism’ conditions)
over the Click area, the Near area and the Away area (Plot: Median,
Box:25–75%, Whisker: Non-Outlier Range).
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FIGURE 12 | Box plots of the duration (in ms) of interactive sequences
around each object (SO, OwnPO and OtherPO) over the conditions
(Plot: Median, Box:25–75%, Whisker: Non-Outlier Range).
FIGURE 13 | Box plots of the mean duration (in ms) of interactive
sequences per trial across each condition (‘Mono,’ ‘Differentiated’ and
‘Parallelism’ conditions) over the click area, the near area and the
away area (Plot: Median, Box:25–75%, Whisker: Non-Outlier Range).
across the ‘Mono’ and ‘Parallelism’ conditions (p > 0.05), the
duration of interactive sequences was longer around OwnPO
than around OtherPO across the ‘Differentiated’ condition
(Z = 2.44; p= 0.01).
Finally, we observed that the interactive sequences were longer
in the Click area than in the Near and Away areas across each
experimental condition (Figure 13).
A Friedman ANOVA for dependent samples showed a
significant difference in the duration of interactive sequences
as a function of intervals around click positions across the
‘Mono’ condition (χ2 = 114.66; p < 0.01), across the
‘Differentiated’ condition (χ2 = 162.82; p < 0.01), and across
the ‘Parallelism’ condition (χ2 = 169.90; p < 0.01). Wilcoxon
matched pairs tests indicated that the duration of interactive
sequences inside the Click area (10% percent of the space length)
was always longer than the duration of interactive sequences
inside the Near area (30% of the space length; ‘Mono’ condition:
Z = 8.74; p < 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 9.67;
p < 0.01; ‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 9.75; p < 0.01) and inside
the Away area (60% of the space length; ‘Mono’ condition:
Z = 8.10; p< 0.01; ‘Differentiated’ condition: Z = 9.02; p< 0.01;
‘Parallelism’ condition: Z = 9.29; p< 0.01).
DISCUSSION
This original experiment, based on the minimalist perceptual
crossing paradigm, is the first to truly go beyond the framework
of strictly dyadic interactions. While previous studies used objects
as distractors of interpersonal coordination, (e.g., Auvray et al.,
2009; Lenay and Stewart, 2012; Froese et al., 2014a,b), we
integrate objects here as the explicit goal of this coordination.
The challenge of this research is essential because it aims at
experimentally illustrating the concept of PSM (e.g., Auvray
et al., 2009; Lenay and Stewart, 2012; Froese et al., 2014a,b), as
part of an enactive approach to triadic situations (Varela et al.,
1991; Stewart et al., 2010). Our main hypothesis consists in
the idea that minimal sensorimotor coordination around objects
would have the structure of a collective sense-making activity,
where the shared or private character of the objects in question
would be formed mutually and re-negotiated continuously within
the interaction process. Our objective thus consists in trying
to understand how, through a dynamics of perceptual crossing
reduced to its simplest expression, the participants can perceive
and recognize that their partner perceives the object that they
perceive. Yet, in the perceptual crossing conditions that we set up,
it is difficult to conduct both the task of perceiving an object and
the task of perceiving the partner. It is especially difficult in the
‘Mono’ and “Parallelism” conditions, where there are no sensory
cues to differentiate the stimulations received in an encounter
with the partner from an encounter with any other object.
Generally, the task proposed was a success: whatever the
experimental condition, the participants clicked the most often
on the SO rather than on the other targets of potential clicks
(OwnPO, OtherPO and anywhere else). Despite our initial worry
about the inherent difficulty in the “Mono” condition, it has
finally proven to succeed quite well, even if we observed fewer
clicks on SO than in the other two conditions. Regardless, this
result gives evidence of the individual recognition of the fact that
this object plays an integral part in the shared world, recognition
that can only follow from the collective dynamics of perceptual
interactions. We have here a first approach highlighting the
“deep entanglement” between the individual dimension (the
decision to click) and the interpersonal dimension (the dynamics
of interaction upon which this decision rests) (Di Paolo and
De Jaegher, 2016). From this point, the specific analysis of the
unfolding of individual activities and collective dynamics must
be able to explain more in details the mechanisms leading to this
success.
Under the ‘Mono’ condition, to take the most radically
minimalist situation, but also under the ‘Parallelism’ condition,
there is no perceptual difference between an object and other
participants. Yet in the pioneering minimalist perceptual crossing
experiment (Lenay et al., 2006; Auvray et al., 2009), the fixed
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object is interpreted as pertaining to a stable affordance for
a reversible perceptual exploration (with possible stops on the
object, but always accompanied by a necessary resumption of
the movement to maintain the perceptual experience). In other
words, the fixed object attracts and organizes the exploration
gesture (Lenay et al., 2006; Froese et al., 2014a). This is indeed
what we observe here: a post hoc analysis reveals that the
participants, for the major part of the trials (all conditions
taken together), remained around an object perceptible for them
(Q1 = 67.45%; Median = 75.94%; Q3 = 82.01%). For all this,
we observed that the participants spent significantly more time
around SO than around OwnPO, even though the two types of
objects have exactly the same objective properties (same size,
same form). Here is the first element of importance to explain
the success of the task, since the participants spent more time in
the area where they finally clicked. The fact that they stay around
SO for a long time, compared to the rest of the space, can then
account for the high frequency of clicks around this object. How
can we explain this result?
The analysis of the indicators concerning the interaction
between the participants around the two types of objects allows
us to better understand the stronger attraction of SO. The “other”
represents a mobile but globally stable affordance for perceptual
activities during the perceptual crossing, since, contrary to the
fixed objects, it does not hold to its spatial determination (Lenay
et al., 2006; Auvray et al., 2009). We note here that, all conditions
taken together, the total duration of interpersonal stimulations
represents a non-negligible part of the trial time (Q1 = 26.14%;
Median = 34.62%; Q3 = 44.63%). The results revealed a
significantly higher number of stimulations resulting from
perceptual crossing around SO than around the private objects
(OwnPO and OtherPO), whatever the experimental condition.
If the two types of object equally affect and organize individual
perceptual activities, the fact that participants spent more time
around SO can thus be explained by the fact that this particular
location of the space reciprocally affects and organizes their
partner’s activity. In fact, SO proposes a simultaneous affordance
(Marsh et al., 2006) that gives the two participants an opportunity
to organize their perceptual activities around a shared location of
the space, which fosters the interpersonal encounter around that
object. In this way, the simultaneous affordance, provided by SO,
combines with the specific affordances relative to the encounter
of a responsive perceptual activity. From an enactive point of
view, we have here the preliminary conditions for the emergence
of an autonomous relational dynamics organized around the
shared object (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher et al.,
2010).
Furthermore, concurrently with the time spent individually
around the different objects, participants tend to click where they
most met the other. In fact, to recognize the shared character of
an object, that is to say the fact that an object is also perceived
by the partner, the participant would have to seek the location
where the perception of the other is added to the location of the
object. Consistent with this idea, the addition of the two types of
affordances – one for an overly stable interaction (with a fixed
object) and the other for a globally stable interaction (with the
other) – can be seen as a mutually constructed pattern of joint
action effects (for details, see Jordan, 2003, 2009). Two additional
remarks can be made here.
(i) On the one hand, in the ‘Mono’ condition, perceiving the
coincidence of the presence of the other partner and of
an object is not easy since this would require knowing
how to discriminate between these two presences. Yet the
participant only receives one stimulation at a time, the same
for the other person or for the object, and thus the sources
of the stimulation are mixed. In the “Parallelism” condition,
the participant can receive several stimulations at the same
time, but they remain undifferentiated (the objects, whether
shared or private, and the body-object of the partner
deliver the same type of stimulations). Thus, the distinction
between those stimulations cannot be made through one
single pattern of stimulation, but from a dynamical pattern
of sensorial events, arising from the course of an active
exploratory gesture. The analysis of the interaction between
the two participants goes this way: it revealed that the
interactive sequences lasted longer around SO than around
the private objects (OwnPO and OtherPO), and that the
participants clicked where they interacted the most. It thus
seems that the longer these sequences were, the more the
participants clicked on SO. The rapid succession of the
encounters bears witness to an interpersonal coordination,
explicitly or implicitly grasped by the participants as a
clue, dynamically and collectively pointing out the shared
character of the object.
(ii) On the other hand, the coincidence of the other person
and of an object is not sufficient to discriminate SO from
the private objects. The participant can just as well find
herself in front of her own private object at the same time
as being in perceptual interaction with the partner. The
object must also be present for the other person, but no
participant gains access to the stimulation of the partner
to be certain of it. In the ‘differentiated’ condition, the
discrimination of the sources of stimulations (partner/fixed
objects) is given to the participants beforehand. They
thus do not need to make this distinction through their
perceptual activity. For all this, we observed that in this
condition, the total time of the mutual stops around the
shared object was very long. Now, the fact of stopping and
maintaining this position shows a certain type of action or
at least a behavioral decision that can be attributed to the
individual, depending on the context in which she finds
herself. Individually, if the participant can then recognize
the coincidence of a perceptual crossing with the presence
of a fixed object, and if she seeks to maintain it as long
as possible, she can suppose that the partner would also
maintain the perceptual crossing if she recognizes that
coincidence. In a certain manner, we could then conclude
that the participant individually passes a social judgment
on the basis of objective perceptual clues (e.g., Michael and
Overgaard, 2012; Overgaard and Michael, 2013).
However, this partial interpretation does not take into account
the fundamental reason for which this type of information
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can occur. No matter the condition, SO is different from the
other objects because the participant is most often present in
its area, not only because she encounters the partner and an
object, but also because the partner reciprocally encounters at
the same location an object and an affordance for interpersonal
coordination. In the framework of a joint action, each participant
maintains her own activity around this object because she is
simultaneously subjected to the proper effect of an object (i.e.,
an affordance for a reversible exploratory gesture) and to the
proper effect of the presence of her partner (i.e., an affordance
for a globally stable interaction) (e.g., Jordan, 2003, 2009). The
resolution of the task seems to result from a shared process, the
presence of each being explained by the presence of the partner
and of an object.
The acknowledgment of the shared character of an object
rests on the reciprocal capacity of the participants to make sense
of their respective actions as a function of the objects present.
We can see in this statement the deep entanglement between
individual and collective dimensions, as proposed by PSM: the
recognition of the fact that an object in the environment is
shared arises from the relational dynamics, as an autonomous
process that influences the individual contributions and allows
the participant to give them meaning (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007; De Jaegher et al., 2010). Both collective and individual
dimensions play a role in the resolution of the task, and a focus
on one of these two sides cannot fully explained the results.
The autonomous character of this process, characterizing the
influence of the collective dynamics on the individual decision
to click, is made apparent by one of the mistakes made by
some of the participants. It is in fact striking to see that the
cases of trials where the participant clicked on the empty point
corresponding to the position of the private object of the partner
(OtherPO) is relatively frequent in the ‘Mono’ (8.72%) and the
‘Parallelism’ (10.05%) conditions, contrary to the ‘Differentiated’
condition, where only one trial out of 96 led to this situation.
In that concrete case, the mere presence of the partner around
her private object was sufficient for the participant to believe
in the presence of an object. For that matter, it is interesting
to note that the probability that the partner clicked on her
private object at the same time as the participant clicked on this
position is very high, in all the conditions: ‘Mono’ (71.42%),
‘Parallelism’ (85.71%) and ‘Differentiated’ (100%). From the
partner’s point of view, however, we have to recognize that
all the conditions were met to justify the decision to click on
this object (notably, maintaining the other’s activity around a
perceptible object). The participants were thus caught up in
an interaction dynamics that brought about a co-construction
of sense, even if that sense was here erroneous, showing once
again the influence of the interaction process on the individual
decision.
In this experiment, the participants coordinate their attention
so as to recognize that an object of the environment is
a shared point of reference. Here it is a question of an
operational definition of joint attention (Mundy and Newell,
2007; Seemann, 2012a). Our results demonstrate that this skill can
be realized minimally through the sensorimotor coordination of
the participants (Fiebich and Gallagher, 2012; Gallagher, 2012).
What is more, we have defended here an enactive interpretation
of joint attention as a process revealing both individual and
collective involvement (Reddy and Morris, 2004; Reddy, 2012).
Our results highlight the entanglement of these two levels (Di
Paolo and De Jaegher, 2016), and make this original experiment
of minimalist perceptual crossing a new demonstration of PSM
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007), this time as part of triadic
interactions. Our results then question the classical approach of
joint attention as deeply individualistic (Tomasello, 1995, 1999),
interpreted at best as a coincidence of individual processing
(Gallotti and Frith, 2013) and having as cues objective behaviors,
certainly dynamic (Moore et al., 1997), yet disconnected from
their interactional context (Kidwell and Zimmerman, 2007).
To be sure, this enactive approach does not take into account
more complex situations of joint attention, notably when one
of the participants actively directs her partner’s attentional focus
toward an object of the environment (intentional joint attention,
see Fiebich and Gallagher, 2012). Nor when the point of reference
to share is precisely not an object available in the actuality
of the interaction (for example in the case of the attentional
coordination around an absent object, most frequently carried
out using language).
In spite of the apparent stability of the strategies observed in
function of the experimental conditions, one possible limit can be
highlighted. In fact, in this experiment, the participants carried
out the three experimental conditions. If we have offset the order
of execution of the conditions, so as to neutralize a possible effect
of the order, it is possible that the strategies used in one condition
were influenced by the preceding experimental conditions. For
example, the fact of beginning with the ‘differentiated’ condition
could have led to a type of strategy that showed it to be
incompatible with the succeeding conditions, which could have
influenced the results. Future experiments will then need to test
a possible interaction effect of the experimental conditions on
the individual and collective strategies. Furthermore, it would be
interesting to separate the experimental conditions according to
independent experimental groups. In this way, we would be able
to propose more trials, so as to promote the appropriation of the
system by the participants and thus permit better individual and
collective performances.
CONCLUSION
In this research, we proposed an extension of the perceptual
crossing paradigm in such a way as to go beyond the
framework of dyadic interactions. Our results supplement
the enactive approach to social cognition, by demonstrating
in an empirical way that the interaction dynamics can also
support the recognition of a common world. Our results
notably underline a deep entanglement between the individual
mechanisms implicated in the performance, and the interaction
dynamics as an autonomous process (Di Paolo and De Jaegher,
2016). From this point of view, we have illustrated the concept of
PSM (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007) within triadic situations,
highlighting a minimalist and sensorimotor approach to joint
attention.
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